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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Confrontation Clause-Allowing a
Child Abuse Victim to Testify Via One-Way Closed-Circuit
Television Does Not Violate a Criminal Defendant's
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause Right if the
Trial Court Specifically Finds Such a Procedure
Necessary to Protect the Child's Welfare.
-

U.S.

-,

Maryland v. Craig,
110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).

Sandra Ann Craig was charged with child abuse and sexual abuse of
Brooke Etze, a six-year-old who attended a pre-school center owned and
operated by Craig.' Prior to trial, the state moved to invoke a Maryland
statute which allows the victims of alleged child abuse to testify via one-way
closed-circuit television. 2 In considering the state's motion, the trial court
admitted expert testimony that Brooke and the other children involved in
1. Maryland v. Craig,

(1990).

-

U.S.

-

-

110 S. Ct. 3157, 3160, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 675

2. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3160-61, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 675. The procedure is found in § 9102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1989).
Section 9-102 provides that:
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article or
Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a child victim be
taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit
television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will
result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge may
question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to be
unobtrusive.
(b)(l) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the child
testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the opinion of the
court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person who has dealt with the
child in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge and the defendant shall be in the courtroom.
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the case would suffer serious emotional distress should they be required to
testify in the courtroom in the presence of Craig.3 Despite the defendant's
objection to the state's motion,4 the trial court permitted Brooke and the
other children to testify via one-way closed-circuit television.5 The jury subsequently convicted Craig on all counts.6

(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons
in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification of a
defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant in the courtroom at the same
time.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989). The statute was enacted to facilitate the
testimony of children in child and sexual abuse cases. Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1121
(Md. 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. _ 110 S. Ct. 3157,
111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990). When the closed-circuit television procedure is used, the child
witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel are in one room, while the jury, judge, and defendant
are in the courtroom. Id. The child witness is questioned by counsel, and a video monitor
displays the testimony of the witness to the people in the courtroom. Id. Although the defendant can see the child witness and communicate with defense counsel through electronic
devices, the child witness is unable to see the defendant. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S.
,
110 S. Ct. 3157, 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 676 (1990).
3. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3 161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676. Although Craig was on trial for
offenses against Brooke only, other children, also allegedly abused by Craig, were called to
testify at trial and provide evidence of other crimes. See Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784, 787, 806
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd and remanded, 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).
Brooke's child therapist said that Brooke feared Craig would harm her or her family, and that
Craig's presence in the room would make it difficult for Brooke to testify. See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990) (No. 89478). Additionally, the therapist said that during preparation for trial, Brooke's fear had
caused disruption in her breathing. Id. The therapist believed that if Brooke were required to
testify in Craig's presence, Brooke most likely would curl up into a ball and refuse to speak.
Id. at 9-10. Experts testified that the three other children would be unable to communicate
effectively because of fear, depression, and anxiety which would result if they were forced to
testify in front of Craig. Id. at 10. The trial judge relied solely on expert testimony and,
although he examined the children to determine their competency as witnesses, he did not
place them on the witness stand in the presence of the defendant and personally observe their
behavior. See Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1122, 1128 n. I1 (Md. 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).
4. Craig, - U.S. at -,
110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676. Craig objected on
confrontation clause grounds. Id.
5. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. _ 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3162, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 676 (1990).
Brooke's testimony was taken in the judge's chambers in accordance with the established procedures and the defendant, judge, and jury viewed the child witness' testimony on television
monitors from the courtroom. Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784, 799 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988),
rev'd and remanded, 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom. Maryland v.
Craig, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990). Craig communicated to her
defense counsel through a private telephone line. Id.
6. Craig, - U.S. at 110 S. Ct. at 3162, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676. The counts included
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The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction and
held that permitting the children to testify via one-way closed-circuit television did not violate Craig's confrontation clause rights.7 The appellate court
agreed with the trial court's reasoning that forcing the children to testify in
court, and in Craig's presence, would have traumatized them and prevented
effective communication.' The Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's
highest court, reversed and remanded because the state's evidence did not
sufficiently justify either the use of Maryland's closed-circuit television procedure or the consequent denial of the defendant's right to a face-to-face
encounter with her accusers.9 However, the court rejected Craig's broad
claim that the confrontation clause requires a face-to-face encounter between
the defendant and his accusers in every case.1 ° The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether, in a child abuse case, the
admission of a child's testimony via closed-circuit television violated the defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights.' Held-vacated and remanded. Allowing a child abuse victim to testify via one-way closed-circuit
television does not violate a criminal defendant's sixth amendment confrontation clause right if the trial court specifically
finds such a procedure neces2
sary to protect the child's welfare.'
The portion of the sixth amendment commonly referred to as the "confrontation clause" provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

child abuse, first and second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and
battery. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3160, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 675.
7. See Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784, 798-800 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd and remanded, 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom. Maryland v. Craig, U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990) (where face-to-face testimony would cause
child emotional distress and interfere with communication, confrontation right not violated by
one-way television procedure). Craig raised a total of seven issues on appeal and charged that
her trial counsel was constitutionally incompetent. Id. at 787. The court rejected each of the
claims. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. -_ - 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3162, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 67677 (1990) (appellate court held state's showing did not meet threshold requirement to invoke
statute). The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that the trial judge must determine that
testifying in the presence of the defendant would cause the child witness emotional distress
severe enough to prevent communication. Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Md. 1989),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Maryland v,Craig, -. U.S. _ 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d
666 (1990). The court reasoned that the expert testimony had not focused sufficiently on the
effect the defendant's presence would have on the children, and the expert testimony could not
be supplemented by judicial observation because the trial judge did not personally observe the
child witnesses while each was questioned in the defendant's presence. Id. at 1129.
10. Craig, - U.S. at _ 110 S.Ct. at 3162, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676-77.
11. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S.
110 S.Ct. 834, 107 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1990).
12. Craig, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 688.
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him....,, The right to confront one's accusers in a criminal proceeding is
rooted in early Roman law, and subsequently developed a substantial foundation in English common law. 14 The original purpose of the confrontation
right was to prevent the accusers in a criminal proceeding from using ex
parte affidavits or depositions against a defendant, in lieu of personal testimony. 5 Several early American state constitutions incorporated provisions
protecting the common law rights of criminal defendants, including the right
to confront one's accusers, and some of the drafters of the federal Constitution demanded that it also include those same rights.16 However, the Con-

13. U.S.

CONST. amend. VI.
14. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988) (Romans granted accused face-to-

face meeting with accusers; English recognized confrontation right); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 496 n.25 (1959) (confrontation right existed in Biblical times under Roman law);
Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926) (confrontation right was common law
right); see also Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pun. L.

381, 384-88 (1959) (citing instances of confrontation right in Biblical and Roman times and
describing modified form of confrontation brought to England by Normans). See generally F.
HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 3-12 (1968) (discussing back-

ground of sixth amendment in English law). The common law right of confrontation had
recognized exceptions and limitations. See Salinger, 272 U.S. at 548 (exceptions existed in
common law confrontation right); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (confrontation clause is general rule of law with well-recognized exceptions); see also Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (Bill of Rights was intended to embody guarantees of
English law without disregarding exceptions resulting from necessities of case); 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (Q. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (common law recognized confrontation
right and intended exceptions).
15. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970) (practice of trying defendant
based on ex parte affidavits gave rise to confrontation clause); Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 330 (sixth
amendment confrontation right intended to prevent use of ex parte affidavits or depositions to
convict accused); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (confrontation provision
made in order to exclude evidence by ex parte affidavits or depositions); see also Jonakait,
Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 578
(1988) (clause aims to prevent ex parte affidavits); Note, The Revision of Article 38.071 After
Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child Shield Law in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 270-71
(1988) (clause's objective is to prevent use of ex parte affidavits and depositions in place of
witness' direct testimony). The confrontation clause is believed to have originated as a reaction to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUION 104 (1968). Raleigh was accused of conspiring with Lord Cobham to commit
treason. See Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modem Dress, 8 J. PUB. L.
381, 388 (1959). While being tortured, Cobham confessed to conspiring with Raleigh. Cobham later repudiated the confession in a letter written to Raleigh, but Cobham's original confession was used as evidence against Raleigh. Raleigh's demands at trial that Cobham be
brought before him for questioning were denied, and Raleigh was convicted and subsequently
executed. Id. at 388-89.
16. See Green, 399 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., concurring) (sixth amendment guarantees
found in colonial constitutions); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120 (1866) (original Constitution
faced severe opposition because it failed to protect personal liberties later embodied in sixth
amendment); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 590 (1980XBren-
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stitution contained no such provision 7 until the sixth amendment was
adopted."8 Although the sixth amendment originally only affected federal
criminal trials, the Supreme Court eventually applied the sixth amendment's
confrontation right to state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth
amendment.' 9
The United States Supreme Court has observed that the confrontation
clause ensures the reliability of evidence presented at trial.2' Accordingly,
nan, J., concurring) (colonial charters and constitutions provided accused certain rights, including open trial proceedings). See generally F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE

CONsTrruTON 22-25 (1968) (discussing particular provision of each state's constitution and
opposition to federal Constitution); Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern
Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 398 (1959) (on recommendation of Second Continental Congress,
states adopted constitutions with common law rights).
17. See Green, 399 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., concurring) (sixth amendment added after
ratification of Constitution); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120 (Constitution failed to protect personal
liberties). The drafters at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 provided for a trial by jury in
federal criminal cases but made no attempt to include any details of criminal procedure. See
Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381, 399 (1959)
(original Constitution silent on procedure other then requiring trial by jury and two witnesses
to convict for treason). See generally F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-

TUTION 24 (1968) (proposed Constitution included no criminal procedure details).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See United States v. Barracota, 45 F. Supp. 38, 38
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) (sixth amendment added common law confrontation right to Constitution);
State v. Gaetano, 114 A. 82, 84 (Conn. 1921) (sixth amendment designed to incorporate common law principles regarding evidence). See generally F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONsTITUTION 28-30 (1968) (Bill of Rights added to Constitution to appease opposi-

tion; sixth amendment provided procedural safeguards to accused); Note, Placing a Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Behind a Screen During Courtroom Testimony As Violation of Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1537, 1542 (1989) (sixth amendment
provides procedural safeguards, such as cross-examination). James Madison drafted the proposal for the sixth amendment based upon the Virginia Bill of Rights written by George Mason and submitted by the Virginia ratifying committee. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 28, 34 (1968). The proposed amendment was adopted

without recorded debate. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring) (drafters primarily concerned with political consequences of proposals; confrontation
right, along with other sixth amendment rights, approved without debate); see also Massaro,
The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 867 (1988) (no
debate on sixth amendment).
19. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79 (1970) (recognizing sixth amendment as obligatory on states); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969) (confrontation right applies
to state trials by incorporation in due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (confrontation is fundamental right obligatory on states). See
generally Annotation, Federal Constitutional Right to Confront Witnesses-Supreme Court
Cases, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1115, 1134 (1990) (fourteenth amendment's due process clause makes sixth
amendment's confrontation clause applicable to state criminal prosecutions); Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 494 (1977) (sixth
amendment rights extended to states).
20. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (confrontation right is functional right
promoting reliability); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1979) (underlying purpose of clause is
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the Court has ordinarily required that a witness testify under oath before the
23
accused2 1 within the jury's view," and be subject to cross-examination.
Although "confront" has generally been interpreted to mean "face-to-

to ensure accuracy in fact-finding process); Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (practical concern of confrontation clause is to provide accuracy in truth-determining process); see also Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 578 (1988)
(clause's mission is accuracy in truth-finding process); Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child
Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775, 820 (1986) (confrontation right's purpose is to ensure
accuracy). Accuracy is promoted by allowing the defendant to test evidence which is adverse
to him. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (clause allows defendant to test evidence and thus ensures
accuracy of facts).
21. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (confrontation ensures witness will
testify in person under oath); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945) (rules requiring
statements be made under oath provide important safeguards); State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d
300, 303 (La. 1974) (underlying purpose of confrontation right ensures that witness will testify
under oath); see also Note, The Use of Prior Recorded Testimony and the Right of Confrontation, 54 IOWA L. REv. 360, 365 (1968) (accused is entitled to face witness against him). See
generally Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775, 82628 (1986) (witness' presence in open court is element of effective confrontation). Testifying
under oath impresses the witness with the seriousness of the matter and protects against perjury. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. Requiring the witness to testify in person also protects against
perjury by making it more difficult to lie. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (more
difficult to lie to person to his face); see also Note, The Use of Prior Recorded Testimony and
the Right of Confrontation, 54 IowA L. REV. 360, 365 (1968) (witness less inclined to lie in
face-to-face confrontation). Scholars have not accepted the theory that the confrontation right
is for the purpose of allowing the accused to disturb the witness by glaring at him. See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 153 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (confrontation no
longer designed for emotional effect); Note, Placing a Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Behind a
Screen During Courtroom Testimony as Violation of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (1989) (confrontation not for "idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or being gazed upon by him").
22. See, eg., Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (confrontation permits jury to view behavior of witnesses as they testify); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965) (confrontation between witness and accused allows jury to take into account manner in which witness testifies);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (clause's objective to require witness to
testify face-to-face with jury, so they can view his demeanor and determine truthfulness). See
generally 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 153 (. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (testifying witness' personal appearance allows jurors to obtain otherwise incommunicable evidence regarding witness' deportment); Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR
L. REV. 775, 825-26 (1986) (opportunity for jury to view witness is element of confrontation).
23. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (cross-examination essential for
confrontation and is means by which witness' testimony tested for truth); Green, 399 U.S. at
158 (confrontation necessitates that witness submit to cross-examination); Douglas, 380 U.S. at
418 (primary interest of confrontation clause secured by cross-examination). See generally
Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775, 824 (1986)
(cross-examination an element of confrontation); Note, Closed-Circuit Television and Videotape Transmission of Child Sexual Assault Victims' Testimony, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV
165, 178-79 (1989) (discussing how cross-examination satisfies purposes of sixth amendment).
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face," 24 the Court has held that actual face-to-face confrontation may, on
occasion, yield to public policy considerations and the compelling necessities
of particular cases.25 As a result, the Court has not interpreted the sixth
amendment to guarantee a face-to-face encounter in every instance, but instead has allowed some exceptions. 26 The most commonly allowed excep-

24. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (fact that "confront" derived from Latin
words "opposed" and "forehead" supports idea that confrontation clause guarantees face-toface meeting); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (confrontation clause provides
criminal defendant right to face his accusers physically); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 106 (1934) (privilege to confront one's accusers face to face is assured); Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (accused has right to confront witnesses against him and look at
them while being tried); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242 (confrontation clause assures defendant opportunity to examine witness personally, as he stands face-to-face with jury and judge); see also
Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Myths Research, andPolicy Implications,89 DICK.
L. REv. 691, 740-41 (1985) (confrontation right includes right to physical, face-to-face confrontation); Note, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 759,
764 (1988) ("confrontation" is defined as a face-to-face encounter).
25. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021 (any exceptions to right to meet accusers face to face would
only be allowed to further important public policy); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980)
(Court has recognized competing interest may permit dispensing with confrontation and has
sought to accommodate competing interests by allowing exceptions); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243
(on occasion, rules of law must give way to public policy and necessities of case). See generally
Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should ChildrenBe Heardand Not Seen? 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1187, 1199200 (1989) (defendant's right to confrontation may yield to public policy concerns); Note, The
New Illinois Videotape Statute in Child Sexual Abuse Case. Reconciling the Defendant'sConstitutionalRights With the State's Interest in ProsecutingDefenders, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
331, 341-42 (1988) (discussing instances where Court has allowed confrontation right to bow
to public policy). Some sixth amendment rights have been interpreted in light of trial necessities. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280-85 (1989) (right to counsel not violated when
judge prevented testifying defendant from conferring with counsel during brief break); Taylor
v. United States, 484 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1988) (no violation of compulsory process where judge
precluded surprise witness' testimony); Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51-54 (no violation of right to
cross-examination where defendant was denied access to investigative files).
26. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (Court has recognized competing
interests may permit dispensing with confrontation and has sought to accommodate competing
interests by allowing exceptions); Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107 (1934) (confrontation right had common law exceptions which may be enlarged); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471-74
(1900) (allowing prior testimony of unavailable witnesses is exception to confrontation right);
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (allowing dying declarations is exception to
confrontation right). See generally Goldman, Not So "FirmlyRooted'" Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REv. 1, 8-17 (1987) (expanding list of traditional exceptions);
Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions"Two Legislative Innovations,
98 HARV. L. REv. 806, 810 (1985) (Court has noted -exceptions based on the notion that
certain types of evidence are likely to be reliable). The Court has allowed public policy concerns to justify dispensing with rights under the confrontation clause by reasoning that the
rights are not absolute. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (confrontation
right not absolute, but denial requires close examination of competing interests); see also Note,
The Constitutionality of the Use of Two- Way Closed Circuit Television to Take Testimony of
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tion involves out-of-court, or hearsay, statements.2 7
Increasing incidents of child abuse28 and the special problems encountered in accepting the testimony of children29 have prompted some courts to
Child Victims ofSex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995, 999 (sixth amendment confrontation
right not absolute). But see H. BLACK, THE GREAT RIGHTS 45 (E. Calm ed. 1963) (discussing
reasons underlying view that prohibitions in Bill of Rights were intended to be absolute). Additionally, the Court has warned against a literal reading of the sixth amendment in some
instances. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (common law exceptions
intended to be respected, and literal interpretation of constitutional provision could protect
accused more than necessary). But see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866) (sixth
amendment rights established by irrepealable law and expressed clearly so that ingenuity of
man could not evade them as problems arose).
27. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 174 (1987) (co-conspirator's statements made while committing conspiracy admitted into evidence); United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 390-91 (1986) (co-conspirator's statements allowed despite failure to show declarant's unavailability); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 78 (1970) (co-conspirator's statements
allowed under established state law exception); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151-52
(1970) (allowed evidence of minor's preliminary-hearing testimony). See generally Graham,
The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State
of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 passim (1988) (discussing the category of confrontation cases involving admission of out-of-court statements); Note, Placing a Child Victim of
Sexual Abuse Behind a Screen During Courtroom Testimony as Violation of Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1537, 1539-50 (1989) (discussing theory and examples of hearsay cases).
28. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) (dramatic increase in child
abuse and sexual abuse); Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 957 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985) (increase in
sexual abuse resulted in increased numbers of child victims as witnesses); State v. Myatt, 697
P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985) (increase in incidence of sexual abuse of young children); see also
Galtney, Mothers on the Run, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 13, 1988, at 22, 23 (estimated one in five female children have been sexually molested); Watson, Special Report: A
Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30 (between 100,000 and 500,000 children
will be sexually molested this year).
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Ky. 1986) (five-year-old
witness said she was unable to answer because she did not want defendant, who was in room,
to hurt her); State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371, 1375 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (expert testified child
victims would become incoherent if they saw defendant), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Tafoya v. New Mexico, 487 U.S. 1229 (1988); Commonwealth v. Lufwig, 531 A.2d 459, 464
(Pa. 1987) (expert testified child would be traumatized by testifying). See generally Ginkowski, The Abused Child: The Prosecutor's Terrifying Nightmare, 1 CRIM. JUST. 31 passim (1986)
(discussing problems prosecutor faces in compelling children to testify in child abuse cases);
Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977, 979-86 (1969) (describing possibility of emotional harm to child from
treatment in courtroom). The problems include difficulty in questioning and cross-examining
a child witness, along with the child's fear, confusion, and sense of intimidation. See Ginkowski, The Abused Child: The Prosecutor's Terrifying Nightmare, 1 CRIM. JUsT. 31, 33 (1986)
(examining difficulty of questioning child); Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of SexualAbuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1984) (fear and trauma may undermine child's ability to testify effectively). An additional difficulty, and the one of most
concern, is that the courtroom experience may result in psychological trauma for the child.
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apply the confrontation clause's hearsay exception to child abuse cases.3°
Under this hearsay exception, a court may admit a child's statements regarding abuse by allowing an adult, to whom the child made the statements, to
testify as to the information the child revealed. 3 ' In the case of Idaho v.
Wright,32 decided the same day as Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court

held that the confrontation clause permits the admission of some hearsay

statements of children.3 3 However, the Court restricted the admission of

See Frumkin, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom Closure in Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court: The Press'Right, the Child Rape Victim's Plight, 11 HASTMNGS CONST.
L. Q. 637, 639-40 (1984) (discussing long-term emotional effects on children who are required
to testify); see also Note, ProtectingChild Rape Victims from the Public and Press After Globe
Newspaper and Cox Broadcasting, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 269, 269 (1983) (testimony exposes victim to embarrassment and degradation).
30. See State v. Boodry, 394 P.2d 196, 199 (Ariz. 1964) (hearsay statements used to avoid
necessity of child testifying against her father); Albritten v. State, 317 N.E.2d 854, 855 (Ind.
1974) (hearsay statements of four-year-old used to convict her rapist); State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d
836, 840 (Kan. 1985) (hearsay statements of child who was disqualified from testifying were
admitted). See generally Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship,72 MINN. L. REv. 523 passim (applying hearsay analysis to hypothetical case involving sexually abused child); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions. Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 806 passim (1985) (examining courts' analyses and applications of hearsay exception in
child sexual abuse cases). The Court has established standards for the admissibility of hearsay
statements. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (showing of necessity and indicia of
reliability required for proper admission of hearsay statements).
31. See State v. Boodry, 394 P.2d 196, 199 (Ariz. 1964) (statements made by child to
baby-sitter were admitted as hearsay evidence); State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 839-40 (Kan.
1985) (statements made by child to caseworker and police investigator admitted as evidence);
State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 200, 202 (Wash. 1984) (statements made to mother of child could
have been admitted under the hearsay exception, if requirements for admission had been met).
See generally Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statementsfor the Purpose ofMedical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C.L. REV. 257, 257-64 (1989) (analyzing use of hearsay statutes which
enable child's doctor to testify about child's description of incidents); Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 442-43 (1989) (discussing use of
hearsay exception statutes for child testimony). Statements made to physicians are commonly
used under the hearsay exception for the admission of the child abuse victim's declarations
into evidence. See Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C.L. REV. 257, 257 (1989) (physician's statements admitted
under hearsay exception).
32.

-

U.S.

-,

110 S. Ct. 3139, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1990).

33. Idaho v. Wright, - U. S. - - 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3145-46, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 651
(1990). In Wright, a pediatrician was allowed to testify as to statements made to her by a twoand one-half-year-old girl regarding sexual abuse the child had suffered. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at
3143, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 648. The child did not testify, and the defendant was convicted of lewd
conduct with a minor. Id. at , -, 110 S. Ct. at 3143, 3145, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 648, 650. The
Supreme Court held that the hearsay statements should have been barred under the facts and
reversed the conviction. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3152-53, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 659-60 (incriminating statements not shown to be trustworthy); see also State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 659
(Minn. 1990) (Court is willing to allow hearsay statements). See generally Peck & Williams,
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such statements to situations where the prosecution either produces the declarant or demonstrates the unavailability of the declarant, and then proves
that the statements contain adequate indicia of reliability.34
In responding to public concerns regarding sexual and child abuse, 35 state
legislatures have promulgated statutes which permit alternative methods of
testimony by the victims of alleged child abuse, thereby protecting the child
from the emotional trauma associated with testifying. 36 In most instances,
Supreme Court Preview, 76 A.B.A. J. 48, 52-55 (October 1990) (discussing circumstances of
case); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions"Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806, 809-11 (1985) (discussing confrontation clause's limitations on
admission of hearsay).
34. Wright, - U.S. at., ., 110 S. Ct. at 3146, 3149, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 651-52, 655-56.
The majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, focused mainly on the element of trustworthiness. See id. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3147, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 652-53 (unavailability of witness
assumed). The Court rejected the state's contention that evidence corroborating the truth of
the hearsay statements was sufficient to provide trustworthiness. Id. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3150,
111 L. Ed. 2d at 547. Instead, the Court required that the hearsay evidence "possess indicia of
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness." Id.; cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 680 (1986) (when determining violations of confrontation clause, court must focus on
particular witness and not on outcome of trial). The Court based the requirements for the
admission of children's hearsay statements on the general hearsay exception requirements
under common law. Wright, - U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 3146, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 651-52; see also
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (requirements for hearsay exceptions include necessity,
as shown by unavailability; and trustworthiness, as shown by indicia of reliability). See generally Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment, 67 N.C.L. REv. 257, 258 (1989) (basis of common law exception for hearsay statements made to doctor is trustworthiness and necessity); Comment, Admission of Grand Jury
Testimony Underthe ResidualHearsayException, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1033, 1047-48 (1985) (case
law requires showings of unavailability and indicia of reliability in order to allow hearsay
statements).
35. See State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245, 1251 (Conn. 1987) (growing public concern
regarding sexual abuse of children); People v. Groff, 518 N.E.2d 908, 912 (N.Y. 1987) (sexual
abuse has become major concern); State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W. 2d 744, 750-51 (Wis. 1982)
(much societal, legislative, and judicial concern for well-being of child-victim witness). See
generally Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HAltv. L. REV. 806, 806 (1985) (attention focused on statistical increase in
child abuse); Note, Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings; Establishing
ConstitutionalProceduresfor Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (1985) (increased media attention on child sexual abuse).
36. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7(a)(1) (Deering 1983) (permits children's videotaped depositions and closed-circuit testimony); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West. Supp.
1990) (authorizing use of closed-circuit testimony of children); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.071, §§ 1, 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (victims under thirteen years old allowed to testify by
closed-circuit television). See generally Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State
Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV.
645, 645 (statutory reform efforts undertaken to improve handling of child abuse cases); Note,
Protecting the Child Sexual Abuse Victim From Courtroom Trauma After Coy v. Iowa, 67
N.C.L. REv. 711, 711 (1989) (common statutory approach to protecting child victim was to
excuse him from viewing alleged attacker). For a survey of states' child witness protection

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss2/8

10

Miller: Allowing a Child Abuse Victim to Testify Via One-Way Closed-Circu

1990]

CASENOTE

the statutes provide for the use of either the child's pre-trial videotaped testimony or live closed-circuit video testimony." One state statute authorized
the use of a screen separating a testifying child from the defendant, 38 but the
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional in Coy v. Iowa.3 9 In Coy,
the state argued that its interest in protecting child abuse victims outweighed
the defendant's confrontation right, and thus warranted an exception to the
confrontation clause." The Court, however, expressed great reluctance to
allow such an exception since the right was explicitly enumerated in the
sixth amendment.4" Instead, the majority reasoned that the confrontation

statutes, see Brief for the American Bar Association (amicus curiae) app. A, Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-6757).
37. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7(a)(1) (Deering 1983) (permits videotaped depositions and closed-circuit testimony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West Supp. 1990) (permits
videotaped testimony of victim under sixteen years of age); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (permits closed-circuit television). See generally Note, The
Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prsecutions Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 806passim (1985) (discussing use of videotaping statutes to enable jury to view child's
testimony); Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437,
440-42 (1989) (discussing use of videotaping statutes and closed-circuit television statutes).
38. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West. Supp. 1988); see also Iowa v. Coy, 487 U.S.
1012, 1023 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Iowa only state authorizing use of screen). See
generally Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 437,
441 (1989) (discussing Iowa court's use of screen); Note, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's
Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitutionalityof Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault
Cases, 79 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 762 (1988) (explaining procedure for use of

screen).
39. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). In Coy, two thirteen-year-old girls, spending the night in one
girl's backyard, were assaulted by a masked man. Id. at 1014. At trial, the prosecution requested that the Iowa law be invoked, and that the testimony of the two child witnesses be
taken either by closed-circuit television or while the defendant was confined behind a screen.
The trial court chose to use the screen, and the jury found Coy guilty of two counts of lascivious acts with a child. Id. See generally The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 143, 151-52 (1988) (describing facts in Coy); Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children Be
Heard and Not Seen? 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1187, 1192 (1989) (discussing background of Coy).
40. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988); see also Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children
Be Heard and Not Seen? 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1187, 1191 (1989) (state has dual objective of
protecting child victim-witnesses and increasing convictions). See generally Note, Placing a
Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Behind a Screen During Courtroom Testimony as Violation of
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1537, 1552-55 (1989) (discussing
cases where states argued compelling state interest).
41. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 (right to confrontation is "narrowly and explicitly set forth
in the Clause"); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("right... to be confronted with witnesses against
him"); see also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (under the confrontation clause,
only witnesses the accused can look at are allowed); Note, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's
Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault
Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 765 (1988) (face-to-face confrontation is explicit
and essential element of confrontation). See generally Note, Placing a Child Victim of Sexual
Abuse Behind a Screen During Courtroom Testimony as Violation of Sixth Amendment Con-
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clause guarantees a face-to-face confrontation4 2 and held that permitting the
child to testify from behind a semi-opaque screen violated the defendant's
constitutional right to face his accusers.4 3
The Court's conservative construction of the confrontation clause in Coy
left unanswered the question as to when a state's interest in protecting child
witnesses might allow some type of exception to confrontation rights via alternative testimonial procedures." However, the majority clearly stated in
Coy that any such exception, if allowed, would require a specific finding of
necessity based upon the furthering of an important public policy.45 In her
concurring opinion in Coy, Justice O'Connor noted that many states had
statutorily provided for closed-circuit video procedures," and that the holdfrontation Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1537, 1558 (1989) (physical face-to-face encounter literally guaranteed by confrontation clause).
42. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016-19 (supporting face-to-face interpretation with Latin,
Shakespeare, case law, and President Eisenhower's hometown code from Abilene, Kansas); see
also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (confrontation clause provides defendant
right to face his accusers physically); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (faceto-face confrontation privilege assured); Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 102
HARV. L. REV. 143, 153 (1988) (face-to-face meeting with witnesses is "core" confrontation
right); Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 448
(1989) (at least, confrontation clause gives right to face-to-face meeting).
43. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-22; see also Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Con.
frontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 895 (1988) (screen prevents face-to-face encounter which
sixth amendment guarantees); Comment, Defendant's Right to Confront the Witnesses Against
Him-Is There an Exception Behind the Screen? Coy v. Iowa, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124, 125
(1988) (Court held use of screen violated defendant's confrontation right).
44. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (declining determination of whether
exceptions exist); see also Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children Be Heard and Not Seen? 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1989) (possibility that exception might exist not denied by majority). See generally Comment, Defendant's Right to Confront the Witnesses Against Him-Is
There an Exception Behind the Screen? Coy v. Iowa, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124, 130 (1988)
(Court established framework for exception by declining to decide whether face-to-face confrontation right was absolute).
45. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021 (exception, if any, would only be allowed for furtherance of
important policy and would require more than generalized finding); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (confrontation right not absolute and may bow to legitimate interests); cf Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 (1982) (compelling interest does not automatically justify mandatory rules). See generally Note, Sixth AmendmentDefendant's Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 766 (1988) (confrontation right exception justifiable only to further important public policy); Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children
Be Heard and Not Seen? 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1989) (Scalia hinted that exception
might be acceptable if finding of necessity to further important public interest was shown).
46. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (one-half of states have authorized use of video procedures); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7 (a)(1) (Deering 1983) (permits videotaped depositions); TEX. CODE ClIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.
1990) (permitting closed-circuit television). See generally Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural
Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89
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ing in Coy did not invalidate those states' attempts to protect testifying children through such procedures.4 7 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor stated that
the confrontation clause's protections might give way to a state's interest in
protecting child witnesses under other, more compelling circumstances.4

The Court addressed Justice O'Connor's "more compelling circumstances" in Maryland v. Craig.4 9 The Supreme Court held in Craig that allowing a child abuse victim to testify via one-way closed-circuit television
does not violate a criminal defendant's sixth amendment confrontation
clause right if the trial court specifically finds the use of such a procedure
necessary to protect the child's welfare.5 0 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, rejected a literal interpretation of the confrontation clause"1 and
recognized that the clause does not grant a criminal defendant an absolute
right to encounter his accusing witnesses face to face.

2

Instead, it indicates

L. REV. 645, 657-58 (1985) (discussing states with videotaping statutes); Note, Sixth
Amendment-Defendant's Right to Confront Witnessex Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 767-68 (1988) (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion).
47. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1023; see also State v. Conley, 416 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987), vacated and remanded sub nom. Conley v. Wisconsin, 487 U.S. 1230 (1988) (Court
vacated and remanded conviction where lower court allowed use of blackboard to block defendant's view of child witness); Note, Sixth Amendment- Defendant's Right to Confront
DICK.

Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CIuMINOLOGY 759, 767 (1988) (Justice O'Connor would permit use of protective devices
in "appropriate circumstances"); Note, Placing a Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Behind a
Screen During Courtroom Testimony as Violation of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,
57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1537, 1559 (1989) (Justice O'Connor emphasized holding limited to shielding methods and not to doom other legislative measures). But see Tafoya v. New Mexico, 487
U.S. 1229 (1988) (Court vacated and remanded conviction of defendant where evidence included videotaped testimony of child victims).
48. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1025 (upon specific finding of necessity, confrontation clause
may give way to state interest); see also Note, Placing a Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Behind a
Screen During Courtroom Testimony As Violation of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,
57 U. CIN. L. Rv. 1537, 1560 (1989) (procedures denying defendant face-to-face confrontation may be overcome by showing compelling state interest). See generally Comment, Defendant's Right to Confront the Witnesses Against Him-Is There an Exception Behind the Screen?
Coy v. Iowa, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 124, 130-32 (1988) (Court developing framework for
exception).
49. - U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).
50. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. _ _ 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 688

(1990).
51. See id. at - 110 S. Ct. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 679 (literal reading of confrontation
clause rejected). The Court stated that a literal interpretation of the confrontation clause was
not plausible because such an interpretation would abrogate all hearsay exceptions. The Court
reasoned that because the hearsay exception allows statements of a declarant who is not in the
presence of the defendant, "confront" could not be limited to mean actual face-to-face confrontation. Id.
52. Id. at 110 S. Ct. at 3163, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 677. The Court stated that face-to-face
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only a "preference" for face-to-face confrontation.53 The Court further explained that trial courts could set aside this "preference" where the necessities of a case and public policy demanded the denial of a face-to-face
encounter.54
The majority reached its more liberal construction of the conrontation
clause by balancing the state's interest in protecting the welfare of child witnesses against a defendant's right to confront his accusers." The Court justified its interpretation by noting that it had previously "harmonized"
society's interest in accurate fact-finding with the goal of the confrontation
clause5 6 when it allowed exceptions to other sixth amendment rights based
on the necessities of trial." The majority recognized the difficulties associated with denying a face-to-face encounter,5" but found that the compelling
state interest in protecting child victims of sexual abuse served a substantial
state policy, 9 and thus provided a sufficient basis to deny a defendant a faceto-face encounter with his accuser.' The Court ruled that a trial court
would have to make a case-specific finding of necessity before allowing child
abuse victims to testify via one-way closed-circuit television,6 1 but refused to
confrontation is not the sine qua non of the confrontation clause. Furthermore, the Court
noted that generally the confrontation clause is satisfied when the defense is allowed a fair
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at_- 110 S. Ct. at 3164, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 679.
53. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 681.
54. See id. at __, 110 S. Ct. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 680 (preference may succumb to
public policy and case necessities).
55. See id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3167, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 683 (state's interest in well-being of
child abuse victims may outweigh defendant's right to face accusers).
56. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 680. The Court observed that the
purpose of the confrontation clause was to ensure the reliability of evidence by subjecting it to
the tests of an adversarial proceeding, as well as to place limits on the kind of evidence that
may be received. Id. at .. - 110 S. Ct. at 3163, 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 678, 680. On the
other hand, the Court asserted that society has an interest in assuring that the fact-finding
proceeding is accurate, and such an interest might require that out-of-court statements be
admitted. Id. at - 110 U.S. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 680.
57. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 681. The Court cited examples of the
defendant's right to presence at trial, cross-examination, compulsory process, and effective
counsel; all of which have been constitutionally curtailed where the necessities of trial dictated.
Id.
58. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682. The Court noted that in Coy v.
Iowa it had suggested that any exception to the right of confrontation would be allowed only
when necessary to further an important public policy. Id; see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1021 (1988).
59. See Craig, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3168-69, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (protecting
against child abuse is important state interest). The Court stated that compelling evidence
exists showing children suffer emotional trauma when testifying, and that a large number of
states had taken measures to protect children under those circumstances. Id.
60. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685.
61. See id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (if state shows necessity, state's
interest in protecting children outweighs defendant's confrontation rights).
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establish any particular procedures which must be followed to reach such a
finding.6 2 However, Justice O'Connor did outline three elements of the finding of necessity.63 Initially, the trial court must determine that protecting
the welfare of the particular child demands the use of the procedure. 64 The
second element requires a finding that traumatization of the child would
result from his or her testifying in the presence of the defendant, and not
simply from testifying in the courtroom.6 Finally, the trial court must find
that the emotional distress the child would suffer would be more than de
minimis.6 The Court upheld the particular Maryland statutory procedure
at issue because it furthered a significant state interest6 7 and ensured reliability of the evidence by preserving both cross-examination and the jury's opportunity to observe the testifying witness.68
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, literally construed the text of the
confrontation clause to guarantee criminal defendants a face-to-face encounter with their accusers.6 9 In addition, he argued that where the Constitution

62. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 688. The Court refused to adopt the
specific categorical evidentiary prerequisites which the Maryland Court of Appeals had stated
would be required before allowing the procedure. The Maryland court would have required
that the trial court question the child in the defendant's presence and consider the alternative
of two-way closed-circuit television. If the trial court found that the two-way procedure would
prevent the child from suffering emotional distress, use of the one-way procedure would not be
allowed under the Maryland court's analysis. Id. at _, 110 S.Ct. at 3170-71, 111 L. Ed. 2d at
686-88.
63. Id. at __, 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685.

64. Id.
65. Id. If the child would only be traumatized from testifying in the courtroom, the child
should simply testify in more comfortable surroundings, but with the defendant present. Id.
66. Id. The trauma would have to be consequential. The court observed that trauma
great enough to impair a child's ability to communicate would be more than de minimis. Id.
67. Id. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3168-69, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 684-85. The Court accepted the
state's reasoning that Maryland's statute was intended to safeguard the well-being of child
victims by avoiding or minimizing the trauma produced by testifying. Id.
68. See id. at - 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682 (Maryland statute subjects
evidence to adversarial testing by preserving elements of confrontation). The Court enunciated
the elements of the confrontation clause to include, in addition to physical face-to-face confrontation, a witness testifying under oath, a witness who submits to cross-examination, and a
jury which is able to observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies. Id. at __, 110 S. Ct. at
3163, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 678. The Court noted that the elements preserved by the Maryland
procedure would permit a defendant to undo a false accuser, or to reveal a coached child. Id.
at ., 110 S. Ct. at 3166-67, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
because the confrontation clause elements were preserved, the Maryland statutory procedure
may provide for greater reliability of the evidence than would allowing such evidence to be
admitted under the hearsay exception. Id.
69. See Maryland v. Craig, _ U.S.....- 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 688
(1990)(Scalia, J., dissenting) (confrontation provision unmistakably clear). The dissent stated
that the confrontation right "always and everywhere" means what it explicitly says. Id. at 110 S. Ct. at 3172, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 689 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished the
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provides an explicit guarantee, the Court should not engage in a "cost-benefit analysis" and thereby adjust the Constitution to satisfy public policy interests.70 The dissent attacked the majority's interpretation of the purpose
of the clause by stating that the clause does not automatically guarantee
reliable evidence, but rather provides procedures that, in turn, ensure reliable evidence.7 1 Justice Scalia rejected the majority's analogy between the
hearsay exception and the use of closed-circuit television testimony."2 The
dissenting justices also questioned the state's asserted interest in protecting
child witnesses by suggesting that the state's actual interest was in increasing
the conviction rate of alleged child abusers.73 Finally, the dissent rejected,
as speculative, the majority's argument that the emotional distress caused by
confrontation with the defendant would itself negate the clause's goal of en74
suring reliable evidence.
In Craig, the Court created a constitutionally valid exception to the con-

cases the majority relied on to claim that the Constitution provides only a preference for faceto-face confrontation by claiming that those cases dealt only with the implications of the
clause, and not with its meaning. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3172-73, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 689-90
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3176, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent
stressed that the Constitution is meant to protect against popular beliefs, not conform to them.
Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3172, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 689 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected
the majority's argument that balancing tests applied to other sixth amendment rights have
considered the necessities of trial and explained that, in those situations, the Court was denying expansive scope to a provision whose purpose was unclear. By contrast, the dissent urged,
the purpose of the confrontation clause is clear, and no further interpretation by balancing the
necessities of trial is needed. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3173, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 690 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
71. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3172, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 689 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3173-74, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 690-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(test applied under hearsay exception cannot be applied to permit denial of right guaranteed by
literal meaning of confrontation clause). Justice Scalia rejected the majority's suggestion that
testimony via one-way closed-circuit television might itself be a type of hearsay evidence. He
reasoned that in child abuse cases, hearsay evidence is only allowed upon a finding of the
witness' unavailability, and there was no such finding in Craig's case. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at
3174, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 689-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent stated that the
majority's requirement that the child be unable to testify was not a finding of unavailability,
but merely of unwillingness. Id. The dissent explained that the child's unwillingness to testify
in the defendant's presence was not a valid excuse, and that placing the witness under the
"hostile glare of the defendant" was precisely what the confrontation clause intended. Id. at
110 S. Ct. at 3174, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3175, 111. L. Ed. 2d at 692-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
dissent stated that a state's interest in obtaining more convictions was not unworthy, but
should not be presented as a humanitarian interest. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3175, 111 L. Ed. 2d
at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3176, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent
reasoned that if confrontation were a disservice, that would be a Constitutional defect which
should be corrected by the amendment process. Id.
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frontation clause by fashioning a balancing test which protects both the testifying child abuse victim and the individual defendant's sixth amendment
rights."' In developing this new test, the Court relied on strong precedent
suggesting that public policy and necessity can outweigh the right of confrontation.76 Although the balancing test acknowledges the important public policy of permitting child abuse victims to testify out of the presence of
their alleged abusers,77 it does not tolerate interference with the defendant's

sixth amendment rights unless the state can prove the compelling nature of
its interest, and the trial court makes a specific finding of necessity. 78 Adherence to this stringent standard anticipates the dissent's concern that the defendant's constitutional rights not be displaced merely by the state's

75. See id. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3170, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 686 (denial of face-to-face confrontation allowed to protect child witness from trauma where procedure used ensures reliable
evidence).
76. See id. at ._, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 680 (confrontation right must
occasionally give way); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (public policy may
permit dispensing with confrontation right); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)
(rule of law may give way to public policy). See generally Note, The New Illinois Videotape
Statute in Child Sexual Abuses Cases: Reconciling the Defendant's Constitutional Rights With
the State's Interest in Prosecuting Defenders, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 331, 341-42 (1988)
(discussing instances where Court has allowed confrontation right to bow to public policy);
Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children Be Heard and Not Seen? 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1187, 1199200 (1989) (confrontation right may yield to public policy). Justice O'Connor referred to the
balancing test as an attempt to "harmonize" the purpose of the clause with compelling state
interest. See Craig, - U.S. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 681.
77. See Maryland v.Craig - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 683
(1990) (state's compelling interest in safeguarding minor's well-being sometimes outweighs defendant's right to confront accusers); see also Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir.
1988) (child may be unable to testify because of fear); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d
224, 226 (Ky. 1986) (five-year-old unable to answer questions because she feared defendant,
who was present). See generally Frumkin, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom
Closure in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: The Press'Right,the Child Rape Victim's
Plight, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 639-40 (1984) (discussing long-term emotional effects
of children testifying); Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 979-86 (1969) (describing possibility of emotional harm to child from treatment in courtroom).
78. Craig, - U.S. at 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682; see Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1025 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (confrontation clause may give way to state
interest if necessity specifically found); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S.
596, 607-09 (1982) (compelling interest does not automatically justify mandatory rules). See
generally Comment, Defendant's Right to Confront the Witnesses Against Him -Is There An
Exception Behind the Screen? Coy v. Iowa, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 124, 128 (1988) (right of
face-to-face confrontation may be overcome by specific showing of necessity to further state's
interest); Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children Be Heard and Not Seen? 50 U. Prrr. L. REv.
1187, 1194 (1989) (in Coy v. Iowa Scalia hinted that exception would require finding of
necessity).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 2, Art. 8

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:555

assertion of public policy.79
The Court's view that the confrontation right is not absolute is supported
by the fact that the confrontation clause has not always been literally interpreted and has a history of exceptions.8 0 Furthermore, strong precedent
supports the Court's assertion that actual face-to-face confrontation is only a
preference, not a requirement.8" Even so, in Craig,the Court tempered any
apparent harshness in denying a defendant the right to a face-to-face confrontation by emphasizing that the overriding purpose of the confrontation
clause is to ensure the reliability of evidence.8 2 From this perspective, the
Court was able to undercut the dissent's strict face-to-face argument and
interpret the confrontation right to guarantee the defendant an opportunity
to challenge the evidence against him. 3

79. See Craig, - U.S. at -., 110 S. Ct. at 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 688 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Constitution intended to prevent public policy from overcoming defendant's rights).
80. See id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 680 (hearsay exception could not
exist under literal interpretation of confrontation clause); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S.
542, 548 (1926) (common law confrontation right had exceptions); Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (confrontation clause has well-recognized exceptions); see also 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (confrontation clause had exceptions at common law). See generally, Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN L. REV.
523 passim (1988) (discussing cases involving hearsay exception to confrontation clause).
81. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. - - 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 681
(1990); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (prefer face-to-face confrontation);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (confrontation may give way to public
policy). See generally Note, The Constitutionalityof the Use of Two- Way Closed Circuit Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995, 999 (sixth
amendment confrontation right not absolute); Note, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's Right to
Confront Witnesses: Constitutionalityof Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 775-77 (1988) (face-to-face confrontation right is not
absolute).
82. Craig, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3163, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 678; see also Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (confrontation promotes reliability); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
89 (1970) (confrontation clause's purpose is to provide for accuracy). See generally Jonakait,
Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 578
(1988) (clause's mission is accuracy in truth-finding process); Myers, Hearsay Statements by
the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775, 820 (1986) (confrontation right's purpose is
accuracy of evidence).
83. See Craig,- U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682 (use of oath, crossexamination, and observance of witness' demeanor subject evidence to adversarial test); see
also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1979) (clause allows testing of evidence's accuracy);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (cross-examination is element of confrontation
which allows witness' testimony to be tested for truth). See generally Jonakait, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 578 (1988) (purpose of
confrontation clause is accuracy in truth-finding process); Myers, Hearsay Statements by the
Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775, 820 (1986) (confrontation right provides accuracy of evidence).
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Because allowing testimony via one-way closed-circuit television preserves
both cross-examination and the ability of the jury to observe the witness'
demeanor, the defendant retains the ability to challenge the evidence
presented.84 The procedure followed under the Maryland statute places the
child witness, the prosecuting attorney, and the defense attorney in one
room with a camera and cameraman."' The attorneys follow traditional
courtroom procedures in eliciting the child's testimony.86 As the child testifies, the defendant, jury, and judge view the proceedings on monitors in the
courtroom. 7 Through the use of electronic communication to the room
where the child is testifying, the judge controls the proceedings, and the defendant retains the ability to communicate with his attorney during the entire examination period. 8 The defense attorney conducts crossexamination, just as he would under normal court procedures. 9 Additionally, although the defendant and the jury are able to view the demeanor of
the child as he testifies, 9° the witness cannot see the defendant and is spared
the trauma of having to testify in his intimidating presence.9 Thus, the oneway closed-circuit television procedure provides great protection for the
child while depriving the defendant only whatever advantage he might have
84. Craig,- U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682; see also Davis, 415 U.S.
at 316 (cross-examination is essential element of confrontation and means by which testimony
is tested for truth); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (primary interest of confrontation clause secured by cross-examination); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895) (clause's objective was to allow jury to view demeanor of witness so as to determine
truthfulness of testimony). See generally Myers, Hearsay Statements by the ChildAbuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 775, 825-826 (1986) (discussing opportunity for jury to view witness);
Note, Closed-Circuit Television and Videotape Transmission of Child Assault Victims' Testimony, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1989) (discussing cross-examination's satisfaction of sixth amendment purposes).
85. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. - - 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 676
(1990); MD. CITS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989).
86. Craig,- U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676; see also MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989) (prosecuting attorney and defense attorney question
child).
87. Craig,- U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676; MD. Crs. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989).
88. Craig,- U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676; MD. Cr5. & JUD.
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989); see also D.A.D. v. State, 566 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (unconstitutional use of procedure where there was failure to ensure that defendant
could communicate with attorney in room with child).
89. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. __ _, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 676
(1990).
90. Id.; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989) (statute provides for
child's testimony to be televised in courtroom).
91. Craig, -. U.S. at._, 10S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682. But see id at -, I0S.
Ct. at 3174, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (object of confrontation clause is to
place witness under defendant's "hostile glare").

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 2, Art. 8

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:555

gained through intimidation of the testifying child. 92 Such an advantage,
however, is neither within the intended purpose of the confrontation clause,
nor does it justify risking the emotional health of the child.93
The Court's holding in Craig will be inapplicable outside the child abuse
context because the balancing test requires case-specific findings of necessity
in protecting the welfare of children.9 4 Before permitting testimony via oneway closed-circuit television, the trial judge will have to establish each of the
three elements articulated by the Court.9" First, the trial judge will need to
determine that the procedure is necessary to protect the particular child who
will be testifying.96 The judge could do so by examining evidence regarding
that specific child's welfare and the effect testifying would have on him. 97
The second element requires the trial judge to determine that the child's
trauma would result from testifying in the presence of the defendant. 9 This
92. See id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 682 (procedure prevents child from
seeing defendant, but other elements of confrontation are preserved); see also Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1894) (interpreting constitutional provisions literally might protect
the accused more than necessary).
93. See State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371, 1374-75 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (child would become incoherent if required to testify), vacated and remanded sub nom. Tafoya v. New Mexico, 487 U.S. 1229 (1988); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459, 464 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(child would be traumatized if required to testify); see also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397,
at 153 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (confrontation no longer intended for emotional effect);
Libai, The Protectionof the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the CriminalJustice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977, 979-86 (1969) (possibility of emotional harm to child from treatment in
courtroom); Note, Placing a Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Behind a Screen During Courtroom
Testimony as Violation of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1537,
1539 (1989) (confrontation not for "idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or being gazed
upon by him").
94. See Craig, - U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (state must show
necessity); see also Leggett v. State, 565 So. 2d 315, 317, n.* (Fla. 1990) (use of television
procedure requires case-specific finding of necessity); D.A.D. v. State, 566 So. 2d 257, 258 n. I
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding of necessity must be case specific). The Court's decision
allows balancing, but the defendant's rights must be weighed against the compelling state
interest of protecting the welfare of children. See Craig,- U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111
L. Ed. 2d at 685.
95. See Craig, - U.S. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (listing three
requirements of necessity finding); see also State v. Crandall, 577 A.2d 483, 486 (N.J. 1990)
(enumerating three findings trial court must make prior to use of closed-circuit television
procedure).
96. Craig, - U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685; see also Crandall, 577
A.2d at 486 (trial court must find procedure needed to protect particular testifying child).
97. See Craig, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676 (judge received
evidence on each child and what his or her specific trauma would be); see also Crandall, 577
A.2d at 486 (as trial approached, child slept poorly, refused to stay alone, and stated she feared
defendant, not courtroom).
98. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S.
110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 685
(1990).
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could be accomplished by inquiring whether the child's trauma would result
from an actual encounter with the defendant or from the general experience
of testifying in a courtroom.99 Finally, the judge will have to consider
whether the potential trauma the child would undergo would be substantial
rather than minimal." In making this assessment, the court could rely on
the testimony of expert witnesses familiar with the child's emotional
health."°1 Because the Court avoided prescribing any exact procedures for
establishing each of these three elements, the trial courts are free to use their
discretion."12 However, the Craig decision should prompt state legislatures
to amend their statutes to predicate use of the television procedure upon a
trial court's finding of necessity."0 3
The Craig decision, taken in light of the Court's previous rejection of the
use of screens and restrictions on the hearsay testimony of children, reveals a
clear preference for the use of the television procedure. "4 This preference is
well founded inasmuch as the one-way closed-circuit television procedure

99. See id. at __-110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676 (judge received testimony that
each child would have difficulty communicating in Craig's presence).
100. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 685; see also D.A.D. v. State, 566 So.
2d 257, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (improper use of television procedure where no finding
that child would suffer at least some emotional or mental harm).
.101. See Craig, - U. S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 3161, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 676 (trial court relied
on expert testimony in evaluating extent of trauma).
102. See id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 688 (Court declined to establish
categorical evidentiary prerequisites).
103. See Maryland v. Craig, - U.S....
110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 685
(1990) (if specific necessity is shown, state interest may justify use of one-way closed-circuit
procedure). Existing legislation may be revised to meet the Court's requirement and may state
that the closed-circuit television procedure should only be implemented after a case-specific
showing of necessity. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7(a)(1) (Deering 1983) (requires finding that testifying is likely to cause psychological harm); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West
Supp. 1990) (no requirement for finding of necessity); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (no necessity finding required); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1021 (1988) (exceptions to confrontation right require more than generalized findings of
necessity). See generally Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions"Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REv. 806, 816 (1985) (suggests legislatures draft statutes
requiring finding that face-to-face confrontation would substantially traumatize child); Note,
Sixth Amendment-Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses:&Constitutionality of Protective
Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 772 (1988)
(showing of necessity should be prerequisite for implementing protective devices).
104. Compare Craig, - U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 3171, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 688 (allowed child
victim to testify via one-way closed-circuit television) with Idaho v. Wright, - U.S.., -, 110
S. Ct. 3139, 3152, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 650 (1990) (disallowed child's hearsay statements which
had no "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness") and Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022
(1988) (use of screen violated constitutional right to face-to-face confrontation). See generally
Peck & Williams, Supreme Court Preview, 76 A.B.A. J. 48, 52-56 (October 1990) (Wright
decision barred hearsay description of statements made by child out of court; Craig approved
child's testimony via one-way closed-circuit television).
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ensures greater evidentiary reliability than does the hearsay exception.1"5
Where testimony is allowed under the hearsay exception, for instance, the
defendant has no opporttinity to cross-examine the child or to view the
child's reactions to questioning.l"' By contrast, because allowing a child to
testify via one-way closed-circuit television still preserves both cross-examination and the ability of the jury to observe the witness' demeanor, the defendant is not forced to sacrifice these critical methods of challenging the

evidence against him." 0 '
Although the Court was not prepared to create a confrontation right exception in its 1988 Coy decision, the 1990 Court finally recognized the compelling need to protect child abuse victims and properly addressed the issue.
The one-way closed-circuit video procedure, upheld by the Court, protects
testifying victims of child abuse without completely denying the defendant's
confrontation right. Moreover, because the system retains the defendant's
opportunities for cross-examination and observance of the witness' demeanor, it does more to preserve the adversarial nature of the proceedings
and enhance the reliability of evidence than does the hearsay exception approach. The confrontation clause's history of exceptions supports the

105. See Craig,

-

U. S. at

-

110 S. Ct. at 3164, 3167, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 679, 682

(cross-examination gives defendant opportunity to test evidence; its presence in closed-circuit
procedure makes such procedure favorable); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)
(cross-examination tests truth); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 417, 418 (1965) (primary interest of confrontation secured by cross-examination). See generally Myers, Hearsay Statements
by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 775, 822 (1986) (where hearsay admitted,
impossible to evaluate observational capacity of declarant; memory and truthfulness go unchecked); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806, 823 (1985) (videotaping statutes preserve confrontation
elements of cross-examination and opportunity to observe witness' demeanor).
106. See Idaho v. Wright, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3143, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 648
(1990) (hearsay testimony admitted although child was not present and did not testify). See
generally Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775,
822-23 (1986) (where hearsay admitted, impossible to evaluate declarant's observational capacity; cannot check memory and truthfulness); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV.
523 passim (1988) (discussing use of hearsay exception in child abuse cases); Comment, Balancing the Right to Confrontation and the Need to Protect Child Sexual Abuse Victims: Are
Statutes Authorizing Televised Testimony Serving Their Purpose? 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv.
109, 113 (1988) (televised testimony better method than allowing hearsay statements of
children).
107. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S.., . 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 682
(1990). See generally Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HAIV. L. REv. 806, 814-15 (1985) (most videotaping statutes preserve confrontation elements of cross-examination and opportunity to observe witness' demeanor); Note, Closed-Circuit Television and Videotape Transmission of Child Sexual Assault
Victims' Testimony, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 165, 198 (1989) (videotape procedures should
provide opportunity for observation of witness).
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Court's view that the right to confrontation is not absolute, and permits the
Court to balance competing interests. By protecting both the child's emotional health and the defendant's capacity to test the evidence, the Court has
struck a fair balance. The constitutional validity of statutes authorizing oneway closed-circuit testimony will most likely promote increases in the
number of children testifying in child abuse and sexual abuse cases, and society will benefit from corresponding increases in convictions of the perpetrators of these heinous crimes.
Lisa R. Miller
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